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NOTES AND COMMENT

In Kane v. New Jersey,3 a situation similar to the case under discussion, the appellant contended that a statute requiring the registration
of nonresident motorists and the appointment of the secretary of state
as attorney for receiving process was in violation of the due process
clause. In that case the court recognized the power of the state to
actually exclude such persons as would refuse to comply with the
statute, from entering the state. In answer to the contention that such
a statute is discriminatory, the Supreme Court held that the basic principles of the law were to render equal protection of the law to residents
as well as to nonresidents It is clear that hefore the passage of such
statute, residents were at a disadvantage in attempting to get jurisdiction of a nonresident offender. By comparing the action of the
New Jersey Legislature to an analagous crime situation, the court
reasoned that the ability to enforce criminal penalties for transgression
as an aid toward securing observance of laws would likewise apply
to the enforcement of the observance of the civil law. There is no
discrimination against nonresidents, denying them the equal protection
of the law, but on the contrary, it puts nonresidents upon an equal
basis with residents.
It follows, therefore, in logical sequence, that if a state has the
power to exclude motorists from entering its borders upon the refusal
of such motorists to comply with its statutes, the state may declare the
use of its highways by nonresident motorists the equivalent of appointment of an attorney upon whom process may be served, and so the
court held in the instant case. It is a progressive and material step toward the protection of citizens of a state possessing such a law from any
disadvantage they may have suffered by reason of not being able to
obtain jurisdiction of an offending nonresident motorist.
STEWART G. HONECK
Navigable Waters.
State Railroad Commission must determine compensation to be paid
state as a prerequisite of contract for removing material from bed of
navigable lake, and the requirement of "compensation to be paid" to
state for taking material connotes idea of use of money. Rights
of riparian owners to center of beds of navigable streams and rivers
and constitutional rights of such owners. Power of the state to dispose
of materials in and under navigable waters.
The importance of Section 31.02 (5) of the Wisconsin Statutes is
fully determined in a recent decision handed down by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the case of Angelo et al. v. Railroad Commission.'
W. B. Angelo and other riparian owners on Lime Lake, Portage
County, sought to enjoin the defendant Railroad Commission from
action under Section 31.02 (5) Stats. in conferring authority upon
certain persons to take marl from the bed.
This lake covers fifty-nine acres and has been used for boating,
hunting and fishing. It was not meandered in the U. S. Government
survey. The patents from the United States conveyed as land the
entire area. There is no showing whether it is connected with waters
flowing into Lake Michigan or the Mississippi and the county map
indicates that it has no apparent outlet.
242 U.S. i6o.
217 N.W. 570. (Wis.)

Decided Jan. 10, 1928.
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On November 5, 1924, the Railroad Commission, after a hearing
at which the plaintiffs appeared granted to one Somers et all., upon
their application, leave to dredge and take marl from the bed of such
lake, upon conditions that said marl should be sold at not more than
$i.oo per cubic yard; that such leave was not exclusive; was but for
five years, the commission reserving full control over all conditions
of such lease. It provided that "no compensation shall be paid to
or received by the State of Wisconsin under this agreement. "No
provision for compensation to plaintiffs or riparian owners was made.
The necessary equipment cost about $8oo, and the average cost for
such removal is seventy to eighty cents per cubic yard. The trial
court affirmed the order of the Commission and dismissed the complaint.
The appellants challenge as in violation of rights claimed to be
secured to them under the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions, the
act of the Railroad Commission in granting such powers over the
objections of plaintiffs and without compensation to them.
The main question is whether the Legislature was inhibited by
constitutional provisions from enacting a statute referring to the Railroad Commission, which reads as follows:
31.02 (5)-The Commission whenever consistent with public rights, is authorized and empowered to make contracts for the removal of any material from
the bed of any navigable lake, to fix and determine the compensation to be
paid to the state of Wisconsin for material so removed, and to enter into contracts, on behalf of the State of Wisconsin, for the lease or sale of such
material, with such conditions as may be necessary for the protection of the
public interests and the interests of the state of Wisconsin, provided that no
such contract shall be made to continue for a longer period than five years.

The Supreme Court reverses the judgment below because of the
failure on the part of the Railroad Commission to comply with the
direct mandate and important condition of the statute.
The Legislature has plainly declared that the Railroad Commission
in making such contracts for the removal of material from the bed
of any navigable lake "fix and determine the compensation to be paid
to the state of Wisconsin for material so removed." Such provision
is a prerequisite in any contract that the commission is authorized to
make. The words used "compensation to be paid," should be given
their primary and ordinary significance and as used on such occasions.
The word "compensation" has been held to be synonymous with "salary." 2 The word "pay" primarily and ordinarily means the use of
money and especially so when used in connection with an obligation
owing to the government. 3 The possible lowering of the price for
such material to the people of the state at large is surely not what
is meant as the "compensation to be paid to the state of Wisconsin
for material so removed." The tenor of the statute is that the state
is disposing of that which is of value, and upon which a price can be
placed and being so, a reasonable proportion thereof must be paid
to the state. The Legislature did not intend to give away the natural
resources of the state with no return therefrom to the state.
'Milwaukee County v. Hulsey, 149 Wis. 8z, 136 N.W. 139.
'Krohn v. Goodrich, 164 Wis. 6oo, 16o N.W. 1072; Oneida County v. Tibbits,
125 Wis. 9, 102 N.W. 897.
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The next question presented by the construction of section 31.02 (5)
is as to the nature of title to the bed of navigable lakes; in whom
is such title vested; and how far may the little title holder make a
matter of bargain and sale of the material therein and thereunder.
In disposing of this question we shall treat only of the subject of
the bed or soil under navigable lakes as separate from navigable rivers
and streams, title to the center of which has been declared to be in
riparian owners, subject to the public rights incident to navigation. 4
This rule carries with it the right to sell separately title to the submerged land of the river bed. 5
We shall also consider it as though such lake, having no apparent
connection with the waters of the Mississippi or St. Lawrence but being
within the statutory definition of navigable waters of the state is subject to the same trust as that proclaimed in Section i Article 9 of the
Wisconsin Constitution.
That the patent from the United States in terms included the land
under this body of water as though it were not submerged does not
affect the situation because such grants are presumably
subject to the
6
rule of the state as to waters and riparian rights.
Our Constitution declares (Section 3, Art. 9):
"The people of the state, in their right of sovereignty, are declared
to possess the ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the state; and all lands the title to which shall fail from a
defect of heirs shall revert or escheat to the people." This provision
is an explicit assertion of a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.
Under such power the state had the right to determine all matters
concerning the title to lands covered by navigable waters subject
only to the paramount authority of the federal government in matters
concerning navigation as a part or means of interstate commerce
and
7
of its proper disposal by the United States prior to statehood.
Section i Article 9 declares:
"The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence,
.... *shall be -common highways and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the United States, without
any tax, impost or duty therefor." This state has assumed such trust
and has always recognized such as an absolute duty and obligation. 8
That there is a substantial difference between rivers and streams
on the one hand and lakes on the other on the question of ownership
to the soil covered by such waters has been plainly recognized by
legislative action in section 30.01 (2) (3) where it was declared that
meandered rivers and streams and rivers, streams, sloughs, bayous,
and marsh outlets, navigable in fact for any purpose, are declared
navigable to the extent that they cannot be obstructed without legislative consent.
Not until chapter 328 of 1895 were lakes so dealt with, and then
it was declared that all meandered lakes, navigable in fact or so declared
'Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 308.
Bright v. Superior, 163 Wis. I.
'Brewer Oil Co. v. U.S. 260 U.S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 6o.
U.S. v. Holt State Bank, 27o U.S. 49.
'Diana Shooting Club v. Hu,rting, i56 Wis. 261.
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by federal survey are navigable and public waters and all persons shall
have the same rights thereon and thereto as in and to all other navigable
or public waters within the state, and the act shall not interfere with
any vested rights theretofore acquired upon such lakes. The law is now
section 30.01 (i).

Whether a given body of water is navigable within

the meaning here attached becomes, in the absence of legislative declaration, a question of fact.
In no other case has the question arisen as to whether the title of
the state to the bed of a navigable lake permits the lawful disposition
of substances found in or under such body of water. Language is found
in several decisions tending to indicate that it was the opinion of the
court that the state's title carried with it no power to grant anything
thereof to others and that such title was so impressed with the public
trust that there was nothing left which resembles any of the incidents
of private ownership so far as the power to dispose of was concerned.' 0
Apparently in England the crown claims the right to mines and
minerals under channels and rivers." In a few cases found in this
country, it has been held a proper exercise such title even though held
under 1trust,
to allow selling or disposing of products therein or there2
under.

-The Court believes that it was within the power of the Legislature
to enact section 31.02 (5) and that no rights of the plaintiffs under
the federal or state Constitutions are invaded by such an act.
Although no mention is made of the rights of riparian owners to such
navigable waters, the presumption is that the Legislature did not intend
to give leave or license to persons acting thereunder to invade or injure
the rights of riparian owners on such navigable waters, or to take
away from such owners or others injured in the carrying on of such
work the usual remedies for wrongs.
GEORGE J. UHLAR
Partnership--Right of Wife to contract as Co-Partner with her
husband.*
Replevin to recover merchandise and store fixtures seized under
a writ of attachment in an action in which the First National Bank
of Crandon was plaintiff and J. F. Sparlks, husband of plaintiff in the
present action, was defendant. Kuss, sheriff, levied the attachment.
Sparks filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and one, Prescott, was
appointed trustee. By stipulation of the parties to prevent deterioration, the goods held by sheriff were sold by the trustee and the funds
kept in his possession. Plaintiff, Nannie Sparks, began this action
against the sheriff and the bank for an alleged amount of $30,000.
Lower court held wife was the owner and entitled to one-half the
proceeds from the sale. Judgment was entered in her favor, from
which she appeals, claiming more money. Notices of review were
filed by the receiver of the bank, subsequently appointed, and by the
trustee in bankruptcy.
'Bixby v. Parish, 148 Wis. 421.
'0 McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427.
'28 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 360, par. 653.
12 Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 380; 12 Sup. Ct. 689; 36. L.
ed. 537.
*Sparks v. Kuss et al. 26o N.W. 929, Wis. Sup. Ct.

